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The Appellate Structure Regularized:
The NBRC'S Proposal
John P Hennigan, Jr.*
I. Introduction
Appeals in bankruptcy cases currently follow a path which
diverges from general federal practice. Instead of proceeding
directly to the court of appeals, review of bankruptcy judges'
decisions is initially conducted by either the district court or an
appellate panel comprised of three bankruptcy judges, with the
possibility of a second appeal of right to the circuit level.' The
National Bankruptcy Review Commission (the "NBRC") has
unanimously proposed a statutory amendment routing appeals
directly from the bankruptcy judge to the court of appeals! That
reform would have the effect of "regularizing" the bankruptcy
appellate structure, that is, bringing it into closer conformity with
non-bankruptcy federal law.3
The NBRC's recommendation is generally sound, but several
issues warrant further consideration. Of particular concern is the
constitutional status of a jurisdictional system incorporating direct
appeals but rejecting the NBRC's controversial proposal to recast
the bankruptcy courts as Article III tribunals.4 Such an arrange-
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; A.B., J.D., Harvard
University.
1. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 158 (1994) (bankruptcy appeals), with id. §§ 1291-92 (general
jurisdiction of courts of appeals).
2. See National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Final Report, Bankruptcy: The Next
Twenty Years, Recommendation 3.1.3., at 752-53 (1997) [hereinafter NBRC Report].
3. The present author has advocated that general approach to bankruptcy appeals. See,
e.g., John P. Hennigan, Jr., Toward Regularizing Appealability in Bankruptcy, 12 BANKR.
DEV. J. 583 (1996); John P. Hennigan, Jr., Toward Regularizing the Bankruptcy Appealability
Statutes, 6 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 365 (1997).
4. See NBRC Report, supra note 2, Recommendation 3.1.1, at 721. Three commis-
sioners filed a "Dissent from Recommendation to Make Bankruptcy Judges Article III
Judges." Id. ch. 5. Unlike bankruptcy judges, who are currently appointed for 14 year
terms, see 28 U.S.C. § 152(b), judges of Article III courts are appointed for life and protected
from diminution of their salary. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. For a discussion of Article III
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ment would result upon enactment of a bill recently introduced by
Representative George W. Gekas, Chairman of the House
subcommittee with jurisdiction over bankruptcy legislation.'
Part II of this article describes the present bankruptcy
appellate structure and the problems associated with it. Part III
evaluates remedies proposed by the NBRC and others and
addresses the related constitutional concern. The Legislative
Postscript considers pertinent developments in the 105th Congress
subsequent to the live presentation of this symposium February 5-6,
1998.
II. The Present System and Its Shortcomings
A. Provisions for Appellate Jurisdiction
Under the present jurisdictional system, bankruptcy judges
render dispositive rulings in many but not all of the matters
litigated in bankruptcy cases; initial disposition is sometimes
reserved for the district court.6 Appeals from those district court
decisions proceed directly to the court of appeals under its general
jurisdictional statutes.7 Thereafter the Supreme Court may in its
discretion grant further review.
8
Whenever a bankruptcy judge does dispose of a matter,
however, the routing of any appeal is governed by a statute
applicable only in bankruptcy, 28 U.S.C. § 158.' The initial appeal
issues posed by the NBRC's appellate proposals, see infra Part II.C.
5. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 412 (1998).
Representative Gekas chairs the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Commercial and
Administrative Law.
6. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(a)-(b) (1994) (providing for district court jurisdiction of
bankruptcy cases and proceedings arising under the Bankruptcy Code or arising in or related
to the case); see id. § 157(a)-(c) (authorizing the district court to refer some but not all of
those matters for complete disposition by the district's bankruptcy judges).
7. See id. §§ 1291-92. Those statutes generally confer jurisdiction over appeals from
the district courts without expressly including or excluding bankruptcy matters.
8. See id. § 1254.
9. See id. § 158. This section, captioned "Appeals," provides in pertinent part as
follows:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals
(1) from final judgments, orders, and decrees;
(2) from interlocutory orders and decrees issued under section 1121(d) of
title 11 increasing or reducing the time periods referred to in section 1121 of
such title; and
(3) with leave of the court, from other interlocutory orders and decrees; of
bankruptcy judges entered in cases and proceedings referred to the
[Vol. 102:4
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is taken either to a single district judge or to a bankruptcy
appellate panel ("BAP") comprised of three bankruptcy judges
designated by the judicial council of the circuit.1" There may then
be a further appeal of right to the court of appeals," again with
the possibility of further discretionary review in the Supreme Court.
Largely because of the limited availability of bankruptcy
appellate panels, most initial appeals from bankruptcy judges'
decisions have gone to the district courts. From 1984 until 1995,
only the Ninth Circuit had a BAP in operation. t2 Five other
bankruptcy judges under section 157 of this title. An appeal under this
subsection shall be taken only to the district court for the judicial district in
which the bankruptcy judge is serving.
(b) (1) The judicial council of a circuit shall establish a bankruptcy appellate panel
service composed of bankruptcy judges of the districts in the circuit who are
appointed by the judicial council in accordance with paragraph (3), to hear and
determine, with the consent of all the parties, appeals under subsection (a) unless
the judicial council finds that-
(A) there are insufficient judicial resources available in the circuit; or
(B) establishment of such service would result in undue delay or in-
creased cost to parties in cases under title 11.
Not later than 90 days after making the finding, the judicial council
shall submit to the Judicial Conference of the United States a report
containing the factual basis of such finding ....
(5) An appeal to be heard under this subsection shall be heard by a panel of
3 members of the bankruptcy appellate panel service, except that a member of
such service may not hear an appeal originating in the district for which such
member is appointed or designated under section 152 of this title.
(6) Appeals may not be heard under this subsection by a panel of the bank-
ruptcy appellate panel service unless the district judges for the district in which
the appeals occur, by majority vote, have authorized such service to hear and
determine appeals originating in such district.
(c) (1) Subject to subsection (b), each appeal under subsection (a) shall be heard
by a 3-judge panel of the bankruptcy appellate panel service established under
subsection (b)(1) unless-
(A) the appellant elects at the time of filing the appeal; or
(B) any other party elects, not later than 30 days after service of notice
of the appeal; to have such appeal heard by the district court ....
(d) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions,
judgments, orders, and decrees entered under subsections (a) and (b) of this
section.
Id. § 158 (a)-(d).
10. See id. § 158 (a) (conferring appellate jurisdiction on district court); id. § 158(c)
(providing for the BAP to hear appeals over which subsection (a) gives the district courts
jurisdiction).
11. See 28 U.S.C. 88 158(d), 1291, 1292(a).
12. See [Senior U.S. District Judge] Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., The Case Against
Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, 4 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1995) (recounting the creation
of BAPs through 1994).
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circuits have recently established them,13 but BAPs may not hear
an appeal without both authorization by majority vote of the
district judges of the district from which the appeal arose14 and
acquiescence by the parties, any of whom can force the appeal into
district court. t5
B. Structural Impediments to the Appellate Function
Appellate review serves two primary purposes: the correction
of errors and the authoritative articulation of the law. 6 Neither
purpose is served well in appeals to a single district judge.
In federal and state courts alike, appeals are generally decided
by panels of three or more full-time appellate judges. 7 It is
reasonable to expect that, free of the pressures of managing a trial
docket, the full-time appellate judges may, through collective
deliberation, improve on the decision below. Bankruptcy appeals
to a single district judge responsible for a separate trial calendar
offer no comparable promise, particularly in view of the trial
judge's specialized expertise in bankruptcy law.
Even when a district judge soundly corrects error, her opinion
may lack the authority needed either to shape the planning of
future transactions or to discourage future litigation of the same
issue. In a number of cases, bankruptcy judges have concluded that
they are not bound by appellate decisions from their own district
court.'" One premise for that conclusion is the observation that
within a single district, the rulings of one district judge are not
binding on the others.'9  Recognizing that local bankruptcy
appellate decisions may, therefore, not be followed on a future
13. See NBRC Report, supra note 2, at 764-65.
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(6) (reproduced supra note 9). Such authorization is generally
accomplished by a standing order, not on a case-by-case basis.
15. See id. § 158(c)(1), reproduced supra note 9.
16. See, e.g., DANIEL JOHN MEADOR & JORDANA SIMONE BERSTEIN, APPELLATE
COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 3-4 (1994).
17. See id. 15-24 (appellate court structure); id. at 92-105 (the work and qualifications
of appellate judges).
18. That conclusion was first announced in In re Gaylor, 123 B.R. 236, 241-42 (E.D.
Mich. 1991). For the ensuing case law, see David A. Levin, Note, Precedent and the
Assertion of Bankruptcy Court Autonomy: Efficient or Arrogant?, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 185
(1995); John H. Maddock III, Note, Stemming the Tide of Bankruptcy Court Independence:
Arguing the Case for District Court Precedent, 2 A.B.I. L. REV. 507 (1994).
19. See, e.g., Threadgill v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d 1366, 1371 (3d Cir.
1991) ("[T]here is no such thing as 'the law of the district.'").
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appeal, some bankruptcy courts have themselves entertained
litigants' challenges to those decisions.2"
Other cases hold that appellate rulings by district judges do
bind local bankruptcy judges,21 and scholarly commentators have
tended to favor that conclusion. However, the weight of recent
case law is to the contrary.
23
The bankruptcy appellate panels genuinely improve upon
aspects of district court review, but they incorporate some of the
same problems and introduce new ones. In bringing to bear the
collective insights of three judges who are experts in bankruptcy,
the BAPs offer real promise of correcting errors by the lower
court.24 But prospects for creating precedent are less certain: the
courts are deeply divided over whether and to what extent BAP
decisions are binding on bankruptcy judges.
25
Moreover, even if every circuit established a BAP and every
district judge voted in favor of its hearing appeals from his or her
district, some appeals would still go to district judges. Congress has
provided that an appeal must be routed to the district court if any
of the parties objects to proceeding before the BAp, 26 apparently
because of the non-Article III status of the bankruptcy judges
20. See, e.g., In re Gaylor, 123 B.R. at 241-42.
21. See, e.g., Bryant v. Smith (In re Bryant), 165 BR. 176, 180 (W.D. Va. 1994)
(dictum); Wright v. Transamerica Fin. Serv., Inc. (In re Wright), 144 BR. 943, 949 (Bankr.
D. Ga. 1992).
22. See, e.g., Daniel J. Bussel, Power, Authority, and Precedent in Interpreting the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1078-98 (1994) [hereinafter Bussel, Power, Authority
and Precedent]; Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 870-72 (1994).
23. See, e.g., Life Ins. Co. v. Barakat (In re Barakat), 173 B.R. 672, 678 n.5 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1994) (finding in the cases since Gaylor a "general consensus" that district court
appellate decisions do not bind bankruptcy judges). See also Daniel J. Bussel, Bankruptcy
Appellate Reform: Issues and Options, NORTON ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. L. 257, 259 n.4
(1995-96) (observing that "the trend in the cases appears to be against stare decisis") [herein-
after Bussel, Bankruptcy Appellate Reform].
24. That promise is a primary argument urged in support of BAPs. See, e.g.,
[Bankruptcy Judge] Thomas E. Carlson, The Case for Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, 1990
BYU L. Rev. 545, 558-59 (1990).
25. Compare, e.g., Casc Corp. v. Milner II (In re Locke), 180 BR. 245,254 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1995) (denying BAP decisions any binding effect) and Oregon Higher Educ. Assistance
Found. v. Selden (In re Selden), 121 B.R. 59, 62 (D. Or. 1990) (according BAP decisions
binding effect only within the district from which the appeal arose), with In re Proudfoot, 144
B.R. 876, 878 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1992) (holding BAP decisions binding throughout the circuit).
For a more extensive discussion, see [Bankruptcy Judge) Henry J. Boroff, The Precedential
Effect of Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Decisions, 103 COM. L.J. 212 (1998).
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(1) (1994) (reproduced supra note 9).
1998]
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comprising the BAR.27 Any litigant confronting adverse precedent
from the BAP has a strong incentive to force the appeal into
district court. There is a view, already adopted by the Ninth
Circuit, that Article III district judges cannot be bound by decisions
of a BAP comprised of non-Article III judges.28
C. Adverse Consequences of the Dysfunctional Appellate
Structure
The inroads upon stare decisis under the present system have
become particularly problematic as bankruptcy filings have
escalated. The high rates of recent years were exceeded during
calendar year 1997 when a record 1.4 million petitions were filed,
some 54,000 of them with respect to business debtors. 29  That
caseload is the base from which appeals are generated. The NBRC
reported just under five thousand appeals in bankruptcy cases
during the year ended June 30, 1997, somewhat fewer than in most
of the preceding four years. 30  On genuinely debatable recurring
issues, that volume of initial appeals produces a large and inconsis-
tent body of non-binding caselaw-fueling arguments for further
litigation and frustrating attorneys and clients attempting to plan
future transactions.
27. The consent requirement was introduced in 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1990) (amended
1994), which was part of the new jurisdictional system enacted in the aftermath of Northern
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). For a discussion of
constitutional and other issues associated with that requirement, see Carlson, supra note 24,
at 567-73. Section 158(c)(1) now requires instead that no party object to the BAP's
determination of the appeal. On the constitutional issues raised by that change, see
Wiseman, supra note 12, at 14-15.
28. See Bank of Maui v. Estate Analysis, Inc. (In re Estate Analysis, Inc.), 904 F.2d 470,
472 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision Makers: In Defense of Courts, 71
AM. BANKR. L.J. 109, 129-30 (1997).
29. As reported by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, there were
1,404,145 filings, composed of 1,350,118 consumer debtor filings and 54,027 business filings.
See Am. Bankr. Inst., Bankruptcy Statistics (visited Nov. 4, 1998) <http://www.abiworld-
.org/stats/newstatsfront.html>. For filings during fiscal years 1993 through 1997, which
ranged from 837,797 to 1,367,364, see Leonidas Ralph Mecham, JUD. Bus. OF THE U.S. CTs.,
1997 REP. OF THE DIR. tbl. 6, at 26 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 U.S. COURTS REPORT].
30. The figures report 3,588 bankruptcy appeals filed in the district courts and 1,293 filed
in the BAPs, for a total of 4881. See NBRC Report, supra note 2, at 763. During 1993-97,
somewhat comparable total figures ranged from a high of 5,774 in fiscal year 1993 to a low
of 4,725 in fiscal year 1996. See 1997 U.S. COURTS REPORT, supra note 29, tbl. C-2A, at 131
(appeals filed in district court) and tbl. S-14, at 59 (total appeals filed in the BAPs annually
during 1996 and 1997); 1996 U.S. Courts Report, supra note 29, table S-14, at 66 (BAP
appeals filed annually during 1993-95, less appeals in which a party opted out)).
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The literature has identified numerous basic issues of bank-
ruptcy law which have long remained the subject of conflicting
decisions.31 One example involves the new value exception to the
absolute priority rule. In general terms, the exception permits
shareholders to retain ownership in a reorganized corporation even
though it is not making full payment to objecting creditors with
higher priority claims on its assets; but the shareholders must in
return contribute sufficient "new value" to the company.32 This
exception may be critical to shareholders' evaluations of their
bankruptcy options.
In 1988, the Supreme Court expressly reserved judgment on
whether that exception, which was at one time widely recognized,
continues to be valid.33 A recent survey of the case law since then
identifies thirteen decisions from the courts of appeals addressing
the new value exception, one of them holding it valid and the other
twelve declining to rule; and 109 decisions by the district and bank-
ruptcy courts, 82 validating the exception, 11 rejecting it, and 16
leaving the issue open. 4 With so many decisions on point, almost
none of which are clearly binding precedent, it is easy to argue the
issue anew with ample citations to support either position.
Remarkably, that enormous volume of litigation did not suffice
to produce a conflict among the circuits, which is often important
in obtaining authoritative resolution in the Supreme Court.3" The
case survey reflects the fact that most parties prepared to pursue
31. See, e.g., Paul M. Baisier & David G. Epstein, Resolving Still Unresolved Issues of
Bankruptcy Law: A Fence or an Ambulance, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 525, 526-28 (1995); Bussel,
Power, Authority, and Precedent, supra note 22, at 1075-78; Bussel, Bankruptcy Appellate
Reform, supra note 23, at 261-62.
32. For a more thorough explication of the absolute priority rule and the new value
exception, see John Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority after Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REv. 963
(1989).
33. See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 203 n.3 (1988).
34. See J. Ronald Trost et al., Survey of the New Value Exception to the Absolute
Priority Rule and the Preliminary Problem of Classification, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY
MATERIALS, CHAPTER 11 BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS, Vol. II, at 595, 636-44 (May 8-10,
1997). Since that survey, the Seventh Circuit has recognized the new value exception. See
In re 203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership, 126 F.3d 955, 966 (7th Cir. 1997).
35. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a) (identifying intercircuit conflict on an important matter as
reason for certiorari). Postscript. Following the live presentation of this symposium, the
Second Circuit rejected the new value exception In re Coltex Loop Central Three Partners,
138 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1998). In view of the resulting conflict among circuits, the Supreme
Court then granted certiorari in 203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership. 118 S. Ct. 1674 (1998).
This case is currently pending before the Court.
1998]
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the issue stop short of the courts of appeals, surely in part because
of the time and expense consumed in two successive appeals.
In view of the difficulty of obtaining authoritative resolutions
through the courts, it should not be surprising that Congress has
often found itself dealing with very specific, sometimes quite
technical, bankruptcy issues.3 6 For example, creditors whom the
debtor pays shortly before bankruptcy may under some circum-
stances be required to disgorge the payment as a "preference."37
For most creditors, "shortly before bankruptcy" means within
ninety days; but for insiders, such as the president or chairman of
a corporate debtor, the preference period reaches back a full
year.38 But what if a non-insider lender obtains repayment of a
loan guaranteed by an insider? Reasoning that such a payment
benefits the guarantor by eliminating his or her liability to make
good on the loan, some courts held that the applicable preference
period was one year.3" Others disagreed.4
The Supreme Court never resolved that debate, perhaps
because it never evolved into a clear conflict between the circuits.
In 1994, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code with the
intention of forcing application of the lower ninety-day limit.
41
There is some question about whether the statutory language
employed actually accomplishes this purpose.42 There should be
no question about the need to reform an appellate system which
regularly requires congressional involvement in such issues.
36. See, e.g., Baisier and Epstein, supra note 31, at 533-34 (identifying a number of
recent legislative resolutions of bankruptcy issues not resolved in the courts).
37. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994) (elements of a preferential transfer).
38. See id. § 547(b)(4)(A) (general ninety day period); id. § 547(b)(4)(B) (one year
period for insiders).
39. The leading case was Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V.N. DePrizio Constr.
Corp.), 874 F.2d 1186, 1194-00 (7th Cir. 1989).
40. See, e.g., CEPA Consulting, Ltd. v. N.Y. Nat'l Bank (In re Wedtech Corp.), 187
B.R. 105, 109-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). For an analysis collecting additional cases, see Robert F.
Higgins & David E. Peterson, Is There a One-Year Preference Period for Non-Insiders?, 64
AM. BANKR. L.J. 383 (1990) (answering the title question in the negative).
41. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 202, 108 Stat. 4106,
(amending 11 U.S.C. § 550 by inserting new subsection (c)). The legislative history clearly
evinces an intention to overturn DiPrizio. See H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 44-45 (1994),
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3352-53.
42. Compare Margaret Howard, Avoiding Powers and the 1994 Amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 259, 267 (1995) (arguing that Congress did not fully
achieve its goals), with James M. Lawniczak, Did Congress Always Say What It Meant in the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994?, 101 CoM. L.J. 372, 381-83 (1995) (answering the title
question in the affirmative).
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III. The NBRC Proposal, Some Alternatives and a Concern
The NBRC proposes to route appeals directly from the
bankruptcy judges to the courts of appeals for their respective
regional circuits.43  Adoption of that proposal would effect
considerable improvements. Namely, it would end the anomaly of
appellate review by a single trial judge, and decisions on an initial
appeal would create precedent binding throughout the circuit.
But those improvements would come at a price. If appeals
were to continue at their current rate, the re-routing would increase
the courts of appeals' caseload by almost ten percent."4 The
NBRC soundly recognized that appeals would actually decline
somewhat because (1) some matters now taken to the district court
would simply not be pursued to the court of appeals and (2) the
binding effect of appellate decisions under the new system would
reduce the appeals of questions already addressed on appeal.45
Nevertheless, it is inescapable that there will be some perceptible
increase in the workload of the courts of appeals, which are already
engulfed in a "crisis of volume."'
A key index of that crisis is the increasing time it takes to
complete an appeal. Under the present system, the median period
from the filing of a second-tier bankruptcy appeal to final disposi-
tion in the court of appeals is 12.4 months,47 more than twice as
long as the five months required for an initial appeal in district
43. See NBRC Report, supra note 2, at 753-67 (discussing Recommendation 3.1.3).
44. According to the NBRC's calculations, the courts of appeals' pending caseload of
40,093 appeals would be increased by 3,937 bankruptcy appeals (the total of first tier
bankruptcy appeals filed in the year ending June 30, 1997 less the number of bankruptcy
appeals taken that year to the circuit level)-an increase of 9.82%. See id. at 762-63.
Comparable increases during fiscal years 1993-1996 would have ranged from 8.73% (1993)
to 6.33% (1996). See 1997 U.S. COURTS REPORT, supra note 29, tbl. B-3, at 88 (total appeals
and bankruptcy appeals filed in the courts of appeals); data on appeals filed in the district
courts and BAP, supra note 30.
45. See NBRC Report, supra note 2, at 763.
46. See Thomas E. Baker & Denis J. Hauptly, Taking Another Measure of the "Crisis
of Volume" in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 97 (1994).
47. See 1997 U.S. COURTS REPORT, supra note 29, tbl. b4, at 99. The comparable figure
for appeals in all areas of the law is 11.4 months. See id. at 97. For an analysis of the
progressive lengthening of that time, see Baker & Hauptly, supra note 46, at 101-10.
1998]
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court' and also longer than the seven months it has taken in the
Ninth Circuit BAP
49
A. Alternatives to Direct Appeals
Arguments for continuing to route bankruptcy appeals to the
district courts often focus on that disparity in disposition time, as
well as on the convenience and economy of proceeding in a less
remote locale.5" Ultimately, however, review in the district courts
suffers from an overriding flaw. Even if their decisions were
accorded binding effect, there is simply no good reason to predict
that generalist judges sitting alone will regularly discern and correct
errors by the bankruptcy specialists below. The present system is
a historical artifact from the early years of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, when the predecessors to today's bankruptcy judges were not
judicial officers but literally referees appointed to assist the district
court." Moreover, as the NBRC observed,52 benefits currently
associated with the geographical proximity of the court can largely
be duplicated in the courts of appeals by exploiting technology for
electronic filing and service, argument by video conferencing and
the like.
Although review by a bankruptcy appellate panel supports a
reasonable expectation that errors below will be corrected, panel
review has actually taken longer than appeals to the district courts.
That delay could readily be overcome by relieving BAP judges of
their trial caseload. Unless they are also accorded Article III
status, however, any attempt to employ them as a comprehensive
appellate system would face constitutional challenge. Specifically,
serious issues could be raised about the requirement of an
alternative forum for litigants not consenting to non-Article III
48. A review by the Federal Judicial Center found an average time of 145 days for the
handling of bankruptcy appeals in the district courts. See FLETCHER MAGNUM, MEMORAN-
DUM TO THE LONG RANGE PLANNING COMMITTEE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER
19 (Dec. 23, 1993), cited in JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE
PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 48 n.21 (1995).
49. See Wiseman, supra note 12, app. 2 at 19 (reporting a 229-day median time for
disposition in the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panels during 1992).
50. The arguments for district court appeals are thoroughly stated in Lissa Lamkin
Broome, Bankruptcy Appeals: The Wheel is Come Full Circle, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 541
(1995).
51. The evolution of the bankruptcy judge's role as it relates to appellate structure is
reprised in H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 39-40 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6001.
52. See NBRC Report, supra note 2, at 757.
[Vol. 102:4
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review53 and the need to provide a second tier of review in an
Article III court.54
B. Expediting Direct Appeals: A Specialized Bankruptcy
Appellate Court?
Direct appeals to the courts of appeals are therefore preferable
to the alternatives on several grounds, but they present the
drawback of a longer disposition time. If that could be held to the
12.4 months currently required for a second tier appeal, the
NBRC's proposal would reduce the total time it now takes to
resolve matters at the circuit level with two successive appeals.
Under the present system, however, more than four out of five
appeals conclude in the district court or BA 55 The proposed re-
routing would, therefore, actually prolong the overall appellate
process in most cases.
Prompt appellate disposition is particularly important in
bankruptcy. In one very common type of bankruptcy litigation, for
example, a secured creditor moves for relief from the statutory stay
of repossession or foreclosure, contending that its collateral is
depreciating.56 If the initial denial of that motion is ultimately
reversed, it is likely that the depreciation will have grown worse
during the appellate process; and the debtor's insolvency will
probably obviate commensurate compensation. In the routine civil
action for damages, by contrast, the events in litigation have
already passed. Delay affects only the allocation of losses arising
from them, and there is no comparable reason to assume that those
losses will not be reimbursed.
Even in a civil suit for an injunction, where future conduct is
at stake, failure to reach a prompt conclusion interferes directly
53. For the arguments over that requirement, see the materials cited supra note 27.
54. For discussion of that requirement, see 13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3528, at 265-66; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts,
Administrative Agencies and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 946-48 (1988).
55. During the year ending June 30, 1997, a total of 4881 bankruptcy appeals were filed
in the district courts and Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, compared with 944 in the courts of
appeals-a ratio of 5.17:1. See NBRC Report, supra note 2, at 763. Consistent with those
figures, a review completed for the Federal Judicial Center concluded that fewer than one
in five bankruptcy appeals to the district court reaches the circuit level. See MAGNUM, supra
note 48, at 19.
56. The stay is imposed automatically with the filing of a bankruptcy petition, 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a) (1994); but it may be lifted "for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of
an interest in property of [the moving creditor]." Id. § 362(d)(1).
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only with the conduct in issue. In a bankruptcy case, however,
delay in resolving litigation between two parties, such as an effort
by the trustee to undo a substantial transfer of the debtor's
assets,57 may create such uncertainty about the funds available for
creditors that it impedes activities potentially involving them all,
such as negotiating a plan of reorganization.
There has been some support for a specialized court of
bankruptcy appeals as a means to prompt and binding appellate
dispositions.58 Although the Commission did not address that
option, it warrants further attention.
In its Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts, the Judicial
Conference recommends that appellate review be performed
primarily in either the generalist courts of appeals for the regional
circuits or in "a Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with
nationwide jurisdiction in certain subject-matter areas."59  The
Plan would reserve the Federal Circuit for "areas of law in which
national uniformity is crucial and the courts of appeals have taken
significantly different approaches ... [or] the subject matter is so
technical that specialized expertise is necessary to render high
quality decisions."6
On that basis, bankruptcy is a likely area for Federal Circuit
jurisdiction. The Constitution expressly contemplates "uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies., 61 Moreover, the complexity
of the subject has long been cited as a reason for committing it to
specialized trial courts.
62
On the other hand, the bankruptcy courts are the nation's
primary expositors of commercial law in general, not just the
Bankruptcy Code. Rulings of such a scope should take into
account and attempt to comport with the overall state of the law,
57. Actions to avoid transfers of the debtor's property are brought by the trustee to
augment the estate, id. § 541(a)(3), which is the basis for any distribution to creditors with
respect to their claims. Several provisions of the Bankruptcy Code identify circumstances
in which such transfers may be avoided. See, e.g., id. § 547 (preferences); id. § 548 (fraudu-
lent conveyances).
58. See, e.g., Nathan B. Feinstein, The Bankruptcy System: Proposals to Restructure the
Bankruptcy Court and Bankruptcy Appellate Processes, NORTON ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 517,
522 (1995-96).
59. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 48, at 43.
60. Id.
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
62. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 48, at 52.
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63an approach best suited to a generalist appellate court. Such a
court can also be a valuable safeguard against the unbalanced
policy orientations sometimes associated with specialization.
Indeed the Federal Circuit, which currently has jurisdiction of
patent appeals, has itself been attacked as "pro-patent."' Finally,
it might be almost too efficient to channel initial bankruptcy
appeals into any single court; the articulation of the law would then
cease to draw upon competing independent decisions from several
appellate forums.
In deciding between generalist and specialist review, the
pivotal issue may be the capacity of the regional courts of appeals
to render prompt decisions. The current volume of bankruptcy
appeals arguably could fully occupy thirteen circuit judges.65 If
thirteen additional judges were simply dispersed among the
regional circuits, however, there would be no good reason to expect
quicker dispositions in bankruptcy than in other sorts of appeals.
On that basis, a direct appeal would continue to take longer than
does an initial appeal to the district court under the present system.
An attempt might be made to draft rules of court identifying
bankruptcy contexts in which a prompt resolution is particularly
crucial. However, such a categorical approach misses a basic point:
the real urgency of any appeal depends on the instant facts and the
state of the pertinent law. In a bankruptcy context, those factors
may best be assessed by a specialist.
If the court of appeals itself lacks the requisite expertise, the
system may simply expedite appeals certified for that treatment by
the bankruptcy judge. As Professor Bussel has observed, however,
63. See Honorable [U.S. District Judge] Barbara B. Crabb, In Defense of Direct Appeals:
A Further Reply to Professor Chemerinsky, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 137, 144-46 (1997) (arguing
for routing bankruptcy appeals to the regional courts of appeals rather than a specialized
forum).
64. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Sung, Intellectual Property Protection or Protectionism?
Declaratory Judgment Use by Patent Owners Against Prospective Infringers, 42 AM. U. L.
REV. 239 (1992).
65. The Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts reported that during 1995 there were
297 appeals filed per judge in the regional courts-of appeals. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, supra note 48, at 10. If all the first level bankruptcy appeals during the
year ended June 30, 1997 were instead filed in those courts of appeals, their caseload would
increase by 3,937. See NBRC Report, supra note 2, at 763. That computes to a caseload
appropriate for 13.26 judges. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. However, routing
appeals directly to the circuit level should in time reduce the rate of appeal.
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that approach would undoubtedly provoke competing claims of
priority for other sorts of appeals.'
Before creating additional circuit judgeships to manage a
system of direct bankruptcy appeals, Congress should consult with
the Judicial Conference and others to determine where best to
deploy the new judges in the interest of prompt dispositions.
C. Direct Appeals with non-Article III Bankruptcy Judges: A
Constitutional Concern
Although the NBRC was unanimous in supporting direct
appeals, there was considerable controversy over whether to
reconstitute the bankruptcy courts as tribunals qualified under
Article III of the Constitution 67 to exercise the federal judicial
power. That would entail appointing bankruptcy judges with life
tenure instead of the present fourteen-year terms. 68  Proposals to
do just that have long aroused both opposition from the Judicial
Conference and political concerns about providing so many judicial
appointments to whichever party holds the presidency.69 Ulti-
mately, the NBRC recommended Article III status for bankruptcy
judges;7 ° but three of the Commissioners dissented.71
Under those circumstances, Congress may well be inclined to
consider a jurisdictional system incorporating direct appeals but
leaving unchanged the present provisions for the bankruptcy judges.
Indeed, that is the approach taken in Congressman Gekas' bank-
ruptcy bill.72
66. See Bussel, Bankruptcy Appellate Reform, supra note 23, at 264.
67. Section 1 of the Article III states:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services,
a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
68. See 28 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1994) (bankruptcy judges' term). Article III status would
also entitle bankruptcy judges to protection from diminution in salary.
69. See, e.g., Vern Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The
Chief Justice, The Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
1, 7-12 (1985) (describing the Article III debate in the aftermath of Marathon).
70. See NBRC Report, supra note 2, at 721-42 (discussing Recommendation 3.1.3).
71. See id. ch. 5 ("Dissent from Recommendation to Make Bankruptcy Judges Article
III Judges.").
72. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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Notwithstanding the NBRC's assurance that "[t]he appellate
structure has no effect on the constitutionality of the bankruptcy
court system,"73 legislation along those lines may be invalid.
There is a plausible argument that the constitutionality of the
present system depends upon classifying bankruptcy judges as
adjuncts to the district courts and bypassing those courts on appeal
obviates that classification.
Constitutional arguments in this area largely derive from the
Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co.74 There Northern, the debtor, sued
Marathon in bankruptcy court claiming damages under state
common law theories. A statute enacted in 1978 conferred on the
district courts jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases and all related civil
proceedings but then went on to direct that the bankruptcy courts
actually exercise that jurisdiction.7" However, the bankruptcy
judges were appointed for limited terms of fourteen years.76
Marathon moved to dismiss on the ground that the statute
unconstitutionally vested the federal judicial power in judges
lacking life tenure. The Court agreed.
In his plurality opinion, Justice Brennan rejected two key
arguments in support of bankruptcy court jurisdiction. First,
Northern had invoked Congress' power to employ non-Article III
tribunals for "public rights" cases, matters involving the govern-
ment that historically could have been determined exclusively by its
executive or legislative branches.77  Acknowledging that prior
decisions had not clearly articulated what rights qualify as public,
Justice Brennan concluded that Northern's claims against Marathon
did not. However, he did suggest that "the restructuring of debtor-
creditor relations, which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy
power... may well be a 'public right."'78 Second, Northern had
argued that, like a magistrate, the bankruptcy court functioned only
as an "adjunct" to the Article III district court, which was the real
repository of the federal judicial power. Rejecting the proffered
analogy, Justice Brennan emphasized the broad range of the
73. NBRC Report, supra note 2, at 758.
74. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
75. See 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1982) (repealed 1984).
76. See id. § 152(b).
77. See Marathon, 458 U.S. at 67-72.
78. Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
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bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction and their power to issue enforceable
final judgments subject only to appellate review.79
Congress drew upon the Marathon plurality's constitutional
analysis in enacting the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984 ("BAFJA"), title I of which created the
present jurisdictional system.0 The district courts are once again
vested with jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases and any related civil
proceedings. 8' Instead of directly referring those matters to the
bankruptcy judges, however, BAFJA merely gives the district
courts the option of doing so (or not)82 -though those courts have
in fact opted for automatic reference in every district except
Delaware. 3 Moreover, the district courts may withdraw any
reference "for cause shown."'
Among matters which have been referred, those viewed as
most central to the case are statutorily classified as "core proceed-
ings," in which the bankruptcy judge may render a dispositive
ruling subject only to traditional appellate review.8 5 In proceed-
ings related to the case more tangentially, the parties may consent
to disposition by the bankruptcy judge. Otherwise, however, he or
she merely submits proposed findings and conclusions to the district
court, which enters a final order after reviewing de novo any
proposal to which a party objects.86
BAFJA's divergent provisions for core and non-core proceed-
ings reflect their respective constitutional rationales. In tangentially
related proceedings, BAFJA treats bankruptcy judges much like
magistrate judges, whose constitutional status as permissible
adjuncts has repeatedly been upheld. 7 In core proceedings, in
which bankruptcy judges operate more independently, the primary
79. See id. at 76-87.
80. Pub. L. No. 98-353, tit. I, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.). Although there were no committee reports accompanying that
legislation, the floor statement of the principal sponsor and draftsman, Representative
Kastenmeier of Wisconsin, announced his intention to "conform exactly" to Marathon in
conferring powers upon bankruptcy judges. See 130 CONG. REC. H6045 (daily ed. Mar. 20,
1984).
81. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a)-(b) (1994).
82. See id. § 157(a).
83. See NBRC Report, supra note 2, at 731 & n.1773.
84. 28 U.S.C. § 157(d).
85. Id. § 157(b).
86. See id. § 157(c).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); NBRC Report, supra note
2, at 759-60 & n.1853.
[Vol. 102:4
THE NBRC's PROPOSAL
basis for their jurisdiction is the Marathon plurality's dictum on
public rights. There is, nevertheless, an argument that they are
functioning as adjuncts in that context as well: they are acting on
reference from the Article III district court, which has the power
either to withdraw the reference or to review any appealable
decision.
In Granfinanciera S.A. v. Nordberg,88 the Supreme Court in
1989 recognized a constitutional right to jury trial in one type of
core proceeding, an action to recover a fraudulent transfer from a
transferee which had not filed a claim against the estate. In his
opinion for the majority, Justice Brennan distanced the Court from
Marathon's dictum that public rights may lie at the core of the
bankruptcy power.89
In the aftermath of Granfinanciera, some commentators have
concluded that BAFJA's jurisdictional provisions for core proceed-
ings may be largely or entirely unconstitutional.9" Others have
concluded that they are valid.9' Their disagreement largely turns
upon the interpretation and weight to be accorded Granfinanciera
and Marathon, on one hand, and two intervening decisions taking
a more flexible approach to Article III.92 The merits of that
debate lie beyond the scope of this article. At the very least,
however, it is now questionable whether the public rights doctrine
supports core jurisdiction under BAFJA.
It therefore becomes more important constitutionally to
characterize bankruptcy judges as adjuncts of the district courts in
core proceedings. If appeals are routed around the district courts,
however, their only remaining vestiges of control would be their
88. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
89. See id. at 56 n.11 ("We do not suggest that the restructuring of debtor-creditor
relations is in fact a public right. This thesis has met with substantial scholarly criticism, and
we need not and do not seek to defend it here.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
90. See, e.g., S. Elizabeth Gibson, Jury Trials and Core Proceedings: The Bankruptcy
Judge's Uncertain Authority, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 143, 168-71 (1991); G. Ray Warner, Rotten
to the "Core": An Essay on Juries, Jurisdiction and Granfinanciera, 59 UMKC L. REV. 991,
1009-10 (1991).
91. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Marathon: It is Time to Overrule Northern
Pipeline, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311 (1991).
92. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985) (involving the Environmental
Protection Agency). Compare Gibson, supra note 90, at 175-77 (suggesting that the more
permissive approach applies only to regulatory agencies, not to bankruptcy judges), with




broadly ignored option not to make a reference in the first instance
and their occasionally exercised power to withdraw a reference
already made. Under those circumstances, it would be implausible
to treat bankruptcy judges as district court adjuncts.93 Without
either a public rights rationale or adjunct status, an untenured
bankruptcy judge's entry of dispositive orders in a core proceeding
would be an unconstitutional exercise of the judicial power of the
United States.
94
Notwithstanding the NBRC's assurances, there is, therefore,
serious doubt about the validity of a system combining Article I
bankruptcy judges with direct appeals. Congress might nevertheless
proceed with such a system if it concludes after careful examination
that there is a good faith argument for its constitutionality. In the
alternative, Congress might consider either conferring Article III
status on the bankruptcy courts or retaining the present routing of
appeals with added provisions to assure that decisions rendered on
an initial appeal are given binding effect.95
IV. Conclusion
Overall, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission has
provided a thoughtful analysis and sound recommendation on
appellate structure. Routing appeals directly from the bankruptcy
judges to the courts of appeals would enhance performance of the
basic functions of correcting error and establishing precedent.
Congress should consider further, however, whether a specialized
bankruptcy appeals court would be preferable to the regional
courts of appeals. If bankruptcy courts are not to be established
as Article III tribunals, moreover, a system of direct appeals raises
constitutional issues which warrant careful attention.
93. See Wiseman, supra note 12, at 14. Judge Wiseman also notes that the district
judges no longer have the power to appoint or remove bankruptcy judges. Moreover, the
bankruptcy judges now appoint their own staff, which were formerly provided through the
district court. See id.
94. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219-20 (1995) (holding without
discussion of adjunct issues that entry of a dispositive judgment constitutes an exercise of the
federal judicial power); see also Richard Lieb, Can a Bankruptcy Judge Constitutionally Hear
and Determine "Core" Proceeding?, 6 NORTON BANKR. L. ADV. 1 (1997) (arguing that
Spendthrift Farm disqualifies bankruptcy judges from entering dispositive orders).
95. For a discussion of the issues raised by such provisions, see Bussel, Bankruptcy




Before Congress adjourned for the 1998 elections, the House
of Representatives passed an amended version of Congressman
Gekas' bankruptcy bill.96 As passed by the House, the bill again
routed appeals directly to the regional courts of appeals from
bankruptcy judges lacking Article III status. 7  For its part, the
Senate passed a consumer bankruptcy bill98 with a different
approach to expediting appeals. They would continue to go
initially to the district court; but if any appeal was not resolved
within thirty days after its filing, any party could remove it to the
court of appeals. Upon removal, the chief judge of the court of
appeals was to direct the clerk of the district court "to enter the
final judgment ... of the bankruptcy judge as the final judgment
•.. of the district court."99
Although House and Senate conferees produced a report
reconciling other differences between their respective bills,
00
they made no provision for the routing of appeals. In any event,
the conference report was never enacted into law. Under the
circumstances, it is reasonable to expect that bankruptcy reform,
specifically including the appellate structure, will receive further
attention when the 106th Congress convenes in January, 1999.
The House provision for direct appeals casts doubt upon the
status of the bankruptcy judges as adjuncts of the district courts,
posing a constitutional problem discussed above.10' With its
retention of an initial appeal to the district court, the Senate's
approach appears designed to avoid that issue by reinforcing the
adjunct characterization.
That design may be flawed in two respects. First, the Senate
bill makes the district court's appellate jurisdiction something of
a formality: it is subject to termination by any party if the appeal
has not been resolved within thirty days, yet the average time for
resolution of district court appeals has been five months.
102
Second, whenever removal is duly sought, the Senate bill
96. See 144 CONG. REC. H4442 (June 10, 1998) (passing H.R. 3150).
97. See H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 411 (1998).
98. See 144 CONG. REC. S10,767 (Sept. 23, 1998) (passing S. 1301).
99. S. 1301, 105th Cong. § 602.
100. H.R. REP. 105-794 (1998).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
102. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
1998]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
mandates entry of a district court judgment of affirmance on the
initial appeal. In other words, the bill would prescribe the
outcome of appeals in Article III courts by legislative fiat, rather
than through amendment of the applicable law. Separation of
powers principles raise doubts about the constitutionality of that
approach. 103
103. Extended discussion of the constitutional issue is beyond the scope of this postscript.
For a recent discussion of pertinent legal principles by a recognized authority, see Martin H.
Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political Perspectives, 46 MERCER
L. REV. 697, 712-721 (1995).
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